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Screening of foreign direct investments could take place through European company
law. The harmonization of company law in the European Union as well as the
CJEU’s case law offer mechanisms which could be used for the screening of foreign
direct investments. Although their primary objective is “the protection of the interests
of members and others”, they could also contribute significantly to an effective
screening of foreign direct investments.
There are five main avenues in European company law that could be used to
screen foreign direct investment: the Takeover Bids Directive in the context of listed
companies, the lawful golden shares in privatized companies, the newly adopted
Shareholders Rights Directive II, and the Cross-border Mergers Directive as well as
the European Company Statute to block the process of a cross-border merger or the
establishment of an SE.
Starting with the Takeover Bids Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC), the two main
provisions are:
1) the board neutrality rule, which does not allow the board of the target company to
adopt defensive measures against a hostile bid submitted by an unwelcome bidder
(Article 9), and
2) the breakthrough rule, under which any restrictions on the transfer of securities or
on voting rights constituting unsurmountable barriers to the takeover bid do not apply
(Article 11).
However, these two main provisions of the Takeover Bids Directive are optional. Art.
12 of the Takeover Bids Directive introduces a complicated multi-level optionality
and reciprocity system. According to the optionality system, Member States may
reserve the right not to require companies to apply the board neutrality rule and
the breakthrough rule. Moreover, where a Member State makes use of optionality,
it shall nevertheless grant its companies the option, which shall be reversible,
of applying the board neutrality rule and the breakthrough rule. According to the
reciprocity system, Member States may, under the conditions determined by
national law, exempt companies which apply the board neutrality rule and/or the
breakthrough rule, if they become the subject of an offer launched by a company
which does not apply the same Articles as they do, or by a company controlled,
directly or indirectly, by the latter.
The adoption of both the optionality and the reciprocity systems by Member States
gives their listed companies the possibility to frustrate hostile takeovers by bidders
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controlled by unwanted foreign investors. On the one hand, in a Member State
applying the optionality regime, a target company could allow its board of directors
to adopt various defensive measures capable of frustrating a bid launched by a
hostile company controlled by a foreign investor. Optionality could also permit the
introduction of restrictions on the transfer of securities or on voting rights capable
of inhibiting permanently the takeover by a hostile bidder controlled by a foreign
investor. On the other hand, in a Member State applying the reciprocity regime, a
target company could retaliate and could allow defensive measures and restrictions
on the transfer of securities or on voting rights against a company, which is not open
itself to takeovers by adopting defensive measures.
Moreover, the Takeover Bids Directive has certain provisions obliging the bidder to
disclose its plan and intentions regarding the target company. Art. 6 is dedicated
to important information concerning bids. According to Article 6(2), the “offeror is
required to draw up and make public in good time an offer document containing the
information necessary to enable the holders of the offeree company’s securities to
reach a properly informed decision on the bid”. Art. 6(3) requires the offer document
to provide certain details about the identity of the offeror, the number of securities
which the offeror undertakes to acquire and its other holdings, the offeror’s intentions
regarding the future business of the offeree company and its strategic plans for the
two companies, information concerning the financing for the bid and the identity
of any persons acting in concert. All this required information could be used as
a screening mechanism of foreign investors by both the target company and the
relevant supervisory authority. In addition to the information disclosed by the offer
document, any other important information about the bid must be provided on an
ad hoc basis by the companies participating in a bid to the relevant supervisory
authority on its request. Similar disclosure obligations are also prescribed for cross-
border mergers of companies.
State-owned companies in various Member States could also attract the interest
of foreign investors. Many of these State-owned companies belong to strategic
areas of the economy. In privatizations of State-owned companies, where foreign
investors are seeking to acquire their corporate control, golden shares compatible
with internal market rules could constitute an effective screening mechanism. Golden
shares or special shares constitute special rights and privileges that Member State
continue to enjoy in privatized companies after their privatization. The CJEU had
the chance to examine many golden shares schemes in privatizations of State-
owned companies at many Member States. These golden shares were considered to
infringe the freedom of establishment (Arts. 49, 54 TFEU) and the free movement of
capital (Art. 63 TFEU). In its golden shares case law, the CJEU structured the criteria
under which a golden shares scheme could be compatible with internal market rules.
In Commission v Belgium, the CJEU stipulated the conditions under which
golden shares could be justified and, as a result, could be lawful (Case C-503/99
Commission v Belgium). Belgian golden shares had certain characteristics, which
convinced the CJEU to accept their justification and their lawfulness and which
distinguished them from the golden shares of other Member States.
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The Belgian golden shares scheme prescribed a right to oppose, ex post facto, some
corporate decisions in privatized companies. More specifically, these shares entailed
a right to oppose only specific decisions, did not allow any arbitrary exercise of the
rights deriving from these prerogatives, required full justification of these decisions
to oppose and opened the door to the possibility of judicial review by Belgian Courts.
These conditions for lawful golden shares could be used by Member States in
order to structure an effective screening mechanism for foreign investments. Lawful
golden shares could either block a foreign investor from investing in the capital of a
privatized company or could control and restrict its actions when the foreign investor
is already the (controlling) shareholder of the privatized company.
The newly adopted Shareholders Rights Directive II (Directive 2017/828) could
also play a major role in this field. There is a new provision for the identification
of shareholders (Art. 3a), which could assist in the screening of foreign investors
participating in the capital of EU companies. More specifically, companies have the
right to identify their shareholders. There are also provisions obliging intermediaries
holding shares to transmit specific information from the company to the shareholder
(Art. 3b). The exercise of shareholder rights is also facilitated: “Member States shall
ensure that the intermediaries facilitate the exercise of the rights by the shareholder,
including the right to participate and vote in general meetings” (Art. 3c).
Hence, foreign investors, who are shareholders in EU companies, cannot hide
behind intermediaries as easily as in the past. Additionally, foreign investors must
disclose specific aspects of their plans for the investee company (Art. 3g regarding
shareholder engagement policy). There are also provisions for the investment
strategy of institutional investors and arrangements with asset managers (Art. 3h)
and for transparency of asset managers (Art. 3i).
The Shareholders Rights Directive II has also some new provisions on transparency
and approval of related party transactions which are crucial for screening certain
activities between the investee company and other subsidiaries of the foreign
investor. These provisions could restrict transactions planned by the foreign investor
and aiming at technology transfer or asset stripping from the investee company.
In addition to the Shareholders Rights Directive II, the foreign investor should be
obliged to provide certain information (e.g. information about major holdings) in
accordance with the Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC).
Screening of foreign investments could also take place through public interest
considerations in the context of cross-border corporate restructuring. Member
States enjoy discretion under the Cross-border Mergers Directive (repealed
and consolidated into Directive 2017/1132) and the European Company Statute
(Societas Europaea-SE) to block the process of a cross-border merger or of the
establishment of a European Company (SE), when such processes are against
public interest. Article 121 of Directive 2017/1132 regulating conditions relating to
cross-border mergers states that: “The laws of a Member State enabling its national
authorities to oppose a given internal merger on grounds of public interest shall also
be applicable to a cross-border merger where at least one of the merging companies
is subject to the law of that Member State. This provision shall not apply to the extent
that Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 is applicable.”
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Moreover, a foreign investor might be interested in acquiring the control of a
company through the formation of a European Company (SE), an EU supranational
corporate type. The formation of an SE by merger could be prohibited by Member
State’s competent authorities on the basis of grounds of public interest, which
are subject to judicial review (Art. 19 of Regulation on the Statute for a European
company (SE)). The transfer of the registered office of an SE and the confidentiality
duty of members of an SE’s organs are also subject to public interest considerations
(Arts. 8 and 49 of Regulation on the Statute for a European company (SE)). These
public interest considerations capable of restraining a foreign investor to participate
in the capital of a company (domestic public or private limited company or SE) could
constitute an effective screening mechanism against undesirable foreign investors.
It is clear that EU company law could play an important role in investment screening.
The optionality and the reciprocity regime of the Takeover Bids Directive could
operate as a screening mechanism. However, we should not forget that the EU
needs a special legal framework for investment screening. These company law
instruments cannot play alone the role of a strong and consolidated institutional
framework for screening of foreign direct investments, but they can contribute
significantly to this goal.
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